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TAX COURT: NEW POLICY TO FOLLOW THE
PRECEDENT SET BY THE COURTS OF
APPEALS; LAWRENCE OVERRULED
JACK E. GOLSEN,

54 T.C. 742 (1970)

Taxpayer applied for redetermination of a tax deficiency asserted by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The sole issue concerned the deductibility
of interest payments on certain 'executive special" life insurance policy loans.
In similar cases involving the same issue, the Fifth Circuit had decided in2
favor of the taxpayer,1 but the Tenth Circuit had held for the Commissioner.
Prior to the instant case, the Tax Court, under the doctrine announced in
Arthur L. Lawrence,3 had long maintained that its nationwide jurisdiction
compelled application of its own rule on a particular issue without constraint
by the diverse precedents of the eleven courts of appeals. In the instant case,
however, the Tax Court reexamined Lawrence and HELD, inter alia, that
effective judicial administration requires adherence by the Tax Court to
decisions of the particular court of appeals to which the taxpayer's appeal

lies and overruled Lawrence to that extent.
The Board of Tax Appeals, now the Tax Court, was established in 1924

as an independent executive agency having jurisdiction to redetermine deficiencies asserted by the Commissioner.4 Initially, the losing party before
the Board of Tax Appeals could bring suit in a federal district court, which

would retry the factual issues, considering the Board's findings as having only

prima facie evidentiary value.5 In 1926 Congress altered this functional allocation by providing for direct appeal to a circuit court of appeals. However,
review was limited to questions of law,6 ostensibly giving a note of finality to
the Board's findings of fact. Since the statute was silent concerning what
constituted a question of law, however, the same issue was often held to be a
question of fact in one circuit and a question of law in another.7
The Supreme Court attempted to dispel this confusion in Dobson v.
Commissioner" in which the taxpayer recovered previously deducted losses
resulting from fraudulent stock dealings. The Tax Court held that the
recovery was capital gain rather than ordinary income, 9 but the court of
appeals, treating the question as one of law, reversed.' 0 On certiorari the
1. E.g., Campbell v. Cen-Tex, Inc., 377 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1967).
2. Goldman v. United States, 403 F.2d 776 (10th Cir. 1968).

3. 27 T.C. 713 (1957).
4. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§900(a), (e), (k), 43 Stat. 336-37. In 1942 the name
was changed to Tax Court of the United States. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, §504, 56 Stat.

957.
5. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §900 (g), 43 Stat. 337.
6. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §1003, 44 Stat. 110.
7. For example, the valuation of real estate has been held a question of fact by one
circuit, Week v. Helvering, 68 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1934), and a question of law by another,
Rockwood Pottery Co. v. Commissioner, 45 F.2d 43 (6th Cir. 1930).
8. 320 U.S. 489 (1943).

9. John v. Dobson, 46 B.T.A. 770 (1942).
10. Harwick v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1943).
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Supreme Court held that the lower appellate court erred in treating as a
rule of law what was actually a question of tax accounting and decreed that
"when the court cannot separate the elements of a decision so as to identify a
clear-cut mistake of law, the decision of the Tax Court must stand."- The
Dobson rule was reiterated in John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner'2 in which
the Supreme Court held that the Tax Court's determination of whether payments by a corporation were interest or dividends was primarily a question
of fact.
Congress abolished the Dobson rule in 1948 by granting the courts of
appeals the power to review decisions of the Tax Court "in the same manner
and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried
without a jury."'13 In other words, the courts of appeals may reverse the Tax
Court's findings of fact where the findings are dearly erroneous.' 4 This
effectively gives a Tax Court decision the status of a federal trial judge's
opinion rather than that of an administrative board's final order.15 It is
dear, then, that the Tax Court becomes bound by the decision of the court
of appeals in a particular case, and on remand must follow that court's
decision.O
In spite of this binding effect, however, the real controversy was not
settled. The Tax Court steadfastly maintained that it had the responsibility
of administering a uniform law of federal taxation, which could not be
accomplished by following the diverse precedents set by the courts of appeals.
Therefore, when the previously settled issue would arise in a subsequent case
the Tax Court would disregard circuit court precedent that it felt was
unsound, and apply its own rule.In Owensboro Wagon Co. v. Commissioner 8 the Sixth Circuit reversed
the Tax Court on an issue concerning stock dividends. Owensboro was
adopted by the Fifth' 9 and Seventh Circuits,20 but the Tax Court in Stacey
Manufacturing Co.21 declined to follow Owensboro and adhered to its own
11. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 502 (1943).
12. 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
13. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 646, §36, 62 Stat. 991. This provision now appears in
INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, §7482 (a).

14. Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 US. 698 (1962).
15. See Wisconsin Memorial Park Co. v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 751, 754 (7th Cir.
1958). "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed." On the other hand, the final order of an administrative

board may be reversed by a court only where there is no substantial evidence reflected in
the record of the case taken as a whole that supports the Board's decision. Universal Camera

Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). An appellate court would therefore be less likely to

reverse an administrative order under this rule than it would a district court ruling (or a
Tax Court decision) under the less stringent "clearly erroneous" standard.
16. See, e.g., Beldridge Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 85 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1936).
17. The Tax Court would profess "due deference" to the circuit court's opinion while
disregarding it. See, e.g., Estate of William E. Edmonds, 16 T.C. 110, 117 (1951).
18. 209 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1954).
19. Richmond Hosiery Mills v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1956).
20. Baker Land & Title Co. v. United States, 231 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1956).

21. 24 T.C. 703 (1955).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss2/13
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rule. The Sixth Circuit reversed stating: "lihe Tax Court of the United
States is not lawfully privileged to disregard and refuse to follow, as the
settled law of the circuit, an opinion of the Court of Appeals for that circuit."22 Moreover, the court asked: "If the tax court is not bound on questions
of law by decisions of the appropriate circuit having jurisdiction, why should
any jurisdiction be vested in circuit courts of appeals to review decisions of
the tax court? "

23

The Tax Court responded to Stacey in Arthur L. Lawrence,- enunciating
four grounds for not following the courts of appeals:
(1) the Tax Court has a national jurisdiction and a duty to apply tax
law equally to all taxpayers regardless of their residence in a particular
circuit;
(2) the Tax Court is not always cognizant of the appellate venue, the
circuit to which the appeal will be made;
(3) the precedent of the particular circuit may not be clear;
(4) the Commissioner does not always acquiesce in the circuit court's
decisions and continues to litigate with the result that the Supreme Court
may eventually adopt the Tax Court's rule.
Lawrence was promptly reversed by the Ninth Circuit 25 but the Tax Court
remained adamant in spite of abundant criticism by the courts of appeals
26
as well as by many writers.

Sullivan v. Commissioner27 illustrates the circuit courts' disapproval of
the Lawrence doctrine. In Sullivan the issue for the Tax Court was whether
illegal gambling expenses were deductible. Although the Seventh Circuit
had already decided in Commissioner v. Doyle28 that such expenses were
deductible, the Tax Court, in light of Lawrence, disregarded Doyle and held
the expenses to be nondeductible. On appeal the Seventh Circuit refused to
agree that "a decision by one judge of the Tax Court ... in effect, overrules
a decision of the court of appeals in the circuit in which both cases
arose .. .", The court felt that this prerogative was reserved to the Supreme
Court and was "not consonant with the responsibilities of the respective
tribunals involved." 0
The first argument in Lawrence, the need for national uniformity in the
tax laws, has been attacked as incongruous in view of the lack of uniformity
within the Tax Court itself.31 Although the single judge opinions are
22. Stacey Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 605, 606 (6th Cir. 1956).
23. Id.
24. 27 T.C. 713 (1957).
25. Lawrence v. Commissioner, 258 F-2d 562 (9th Cir. 1958).
26. The text accompanying notes 28-43 outlines the basic criticisms of each of the arguments put forth by Lawrence.
27. 241 F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1957).
28. 231 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1956).
29. Sullivan v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 46, 47 (7th Cir. 1957).
30. Id.
31. Vom Baur & Coburn, Tax Court Wrong in Denying Taxpayer the Rule Laid Down
in His Circuit, 8 J. TAxATION 228, 232 (1958).
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reviewed by the chief judge before they are announced, two-thirds are released
3 2
as memorandum opinions and are not binding on the Tax Court itself.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that if the Tax Court does endeavor to
function as a court rather than as an executive agency, it should recognize
its primary function as adjudicating the dispute before it and not as determining broad tax policy. The promotion of uniformity should be left to the
Supreme Court.33
The Lawrence court's appellate venue argument requires some explanation
of Tax Court jurisdiction. The Tax Court may hear only redeterminations
of deficiencies of income, estate, gift, and excess profits taxes. 34 If the taxpayer pays the asserted deficiency he may sue for refund in a federal district
court or the court of claims. 35 If he cannot afford to pay the deficiency the
taxpayer's only forum is the Tax Court. At the time of Lawrence any party in
a tax case could appeal as of right to the court of appeals for the circuit where
the return was filed or, if none were filed, to the District of Columbia Circuit. 30 Further, the parties could stipulate to an appeal to any circuit, 7
and if two or more taxpayers before the Tax Court had filed returns in
different circuits each could appeal to his own circuit.
Thus, the Lawrence court argued in support of its holding that the Tax
Court may not know in which circuit a return was filed, the parties may
choose to appeal to a different circuit, or the case may be appealable to more
than one circuit. The first two situations pose no real problem. First, the
Tax Court can always ascertain where the return was filed and second, it is
unlikely that the winning party will stipulate to an appeal to a circuit with
precedent unfavorable to his case, leaving as a problem only the possibility
of a case appealable to more than one circuit. Should two taxpayers from
different circuits be before the Tax Court, one from a circuit with precedent
on the particular issue favoring the Commissioner and the other from a circuit
with precedent favoring the taxpayer, the question arises concerning which
precedent the Tax Court should follow. One suggestion is that the case be

32. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HAsv. L. REV. 1153, 1171-72
(1944).
33. Comment, Heresy in the Hierarchy: Tax Court Rejection of Court of Appeals Precedents, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 717, 721 (1957). It is interesting to note that Congress had finally
settled the matter of the constitutional status of the Tax Court. The Tax Reform Act of 1969
abolished the Tax Court of the United States and established the United States Tax Court
as a legislative court under article I of the Constitution. Thus, for the first time the Tax
Court has contempt powers and can enforce its own decisions. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §7441.
34. INr. REv. CODE of 1954, §7442.
35. 28 U.S.C. §§1346 (a) (1), 1491 (1964).
86. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §7482 (b) (1). The Code was amended in 1966 to provide
for appeals according to the legal residence of the taxpayer instead of the revenue office to
which the return was made. Pub. L. No. 89-713, §3 (c), 80 Stat. 1109 (1966).
37. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §7482 (b) (2).
88. Vom Baur & Coburn, supra note 31, at 232. The problem is that it would seem
to be the most patent discrimination to decide a case on the basis of the taxpayer's residence
rather than on the tax law itself. However, on appeal the two circuits would reach different
results anyway.
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decided as to each litigant in accord with the precedent in his own circuit88
39
The instant case explicitly leaves this question unanswered.
The Lawrence court's argument that a circuit court's rule on the particular
issue may not be clear has not been taken seriously. The prospect of unclear
precedent in a few instances should not prevent the Tax Court from following
the courts of appeals in the majority of cases where the precedent is most
likely at least reasonably dear.
Finally, Lawrence suggested that the Supreme Court may overrule the
4
circuit and adopt the Tax Court's rule.- The instant case ' establishes the
rule that if upon reconsideration the Tax Court considers its ruling to be
preferable, it will nevertheless defer to the court of appeals' decision but will
indicate its reasons for disagreeing. 42 The Commissioner can then continue
to litigate the issue and if a conflict develops he can seek certiorari to the
Supreme Court, which can then make the final determination of the issue.
Unfortunately, the scope of the arguments raised by both the Lawrence
court and the courts of appeals largely ignored the impact on the taxpayer.
A taxpayer unable to pay the deficiency must seek relief in the Tax Court.
If the Tax Court's ruling is adverse to the taxpayer, he can appeal and gain
a reversal if the circuit's rule is adverse to that of the Tax Court. However,
in all likelihood, the taxpayer who cannot afford to pay the deficiency cannot
afford the expense and delay of an appeal. As one writer suggests, a taxpayer
who knew the probable result of an appeal, but could only benefit from the
law of the circuit by paying the deficiency or the cost of an appeal would
feel that "the law is a ass-an idiot." 43
Another burden on the taxpayer is the conflict present between circuits.
The Supreme Court can settle these conflicts on certiorari-a rarity in tax

39. 54 T.C. 742, CCH TAx CT. REP. Dec. No. 30,049, at 2668 (1970). "This case presents no such problem, and accordingly we need not decide now what course to take in
the event that we are faced with it."
40. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 320 U.S. 418, revug 133
F.2d 131 (8th Cir.), which reversed 423 CCH B.T.A. Mem. 7232-A (1943).
41. 54 T.C. No. 742, CCH TAx Cr. REP. Dec. No. 30,049, at 2668 (1970).
42. This solution had been advocated by several authorities. See, e.g., Orkin, The
Finality of the Court of Appeals Decisions in the Tax Court: A Dichotomy of Opinion,
43 A.B.A.J. 945, 946 (1957). Since the instant decision was handed down it has been cited
by the Tax Court four times. Only once has the Tax Court followed the court of appeals.
A. N. Saperstein, 29 T.C.M. 916 (1970). In Estate of Dwight B. Roy, Jr., 54 T.C. No. 125,
CCH TAx CT. Rep. Dec. No. 30,182, at 3028 (1970), the Tax Court was faced with precedent
on all fours from the Seventh Circuit but respectfully declined to follow it since the appeal
was to the Second Circuit. The court said: "Golsen . . . does not affect the validity of
Lawrence in this regard since the Second Circuit has not yet had the issue before it." The
same result was reached by the same reasoning in Herman Landerman, 54 T.C. 1042 (1970).
Moreover, in Estate of Ernest Clarke, 54 T.C. 1149 (1970), the Tax Court considered three
cases in the controlling circuit and reached an opposite conclusion, distinguishing all three
cases on the facts.
43. Vom Bauer & Coburn, supra note 31, at 233 (quoting from C. DIcKENs, OLIvER
TwisT ch. 51). The same authors suggest deciding a case both ways when it is appealable
to the circuits with differing precedent. How would they feel if they lost while a co-party
won before the same court solely because they lived in different circuits?
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cases 44-but even if certiorari is granted the additional delay and expense
is simply too much for the average taxpayer.45
What effect, then, does the instant case have on the taxpayer? The attorney
can still shop for the circuit with a rule to his liking, but the taxpayer no
longer must choose between paying the deficiency or paying for an appeal. 46
Congress created the Tax Court to lessen the financial burden of judicial
review, and the instant case does, in 1970, what Congress thought it had done
in 1924Y.4 On the other hand, the instant case apparently diminishes the
federal common law of taxation in the sense that prior to the instant case
some reliance could be placed on the rulings of the Tax Court, notwithstanding the taxpayer's residence and any disagreement among the circuits. Now,
however, the tax advocate must direct his attention primarily to the law of
eleven appellate circuits. 4s Thus, whatever benefit may be derived from
expeditious access to the law of the particular circuit may be more than offset
by the inherent difficulty in assessing the federal tax law as interpreted by
the eleven circuits.
Several problems persist, notably that cases may be appealable to more
than one circuit, and that settlement of conflict by certiorari is costly and
inexpedient. Perhaps the end of intrajudicial rivalry will focus some attention
on these problems. One recurrent suggestion is that a separate court of tax
appeals be established to hear appeals of tax cases from all lower courts,
subject only to certiorari to the Supreme Court.49 This would not only relieve

the courts of appeals of the onerous burden of dealing with specialized tax
questions but would also eliminate appellate conflict since there would be
only one appellate court applying a nationally uniform tax law to all taxpayers. Such a system would answer the arguments raised by Lawrence as
well as provide a solution to the problems left unresolved by the instant case.
MARiSHALL W.

LirAK

44. Griswold, supra note 32, at 1154.
45. A classic example of the inefficacy of certiorari is Helvering v. Canfield, 291 U.S.
163 (1934) (Supreme Court decided case eleven years after taxable year in issue).
46. For a discussion of the factors involved in choosing a forum for tax litigation, see
Garbis & Frome, Selecting the Court for the Optimum Disposition of a Tax Controversy, 27
J. TA 7AON 216 (1967).
47. Congress recently initiated a measure that should prove a genuine boon to the
small taxpayer. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §7463, provides for a small claims procedure for
cases where the amount in controversy does not exceed $1,000. The procedure is greatly
simplified to accommodate the pro se taxpayer.
48. As an alternative, the Court of Claims remains as a forum where only one rule is
applied, however, access to the forum is conditioned upon payment of the asserted deficiency.
49. Griswold, note 32 supra; Note, Controversy Between the Tax Court and Courts of
Appeals: Is the Tax Court Bound by the Precedent of its Reviewing Court?, 7 Dvsts L.J.

45 (1957).
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